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THE CONSTITUTION AND POLITICAL 
PARTIES: SUPREME COURT 
JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PARTYBUILDING 
Brian L. Porto • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 1980s, several political scientists produced com-
mentaries criticizing federal court decisions concerning state regula-
tion of political parties as reflecting judicial ambivalence about 
"responsible" or "ideological, programmatic, centralized and disci-
plined" political parties.' These commentators argued that the fed-
eral courts, notably the United States Supreme Court, are unclear 
• Assistant Professor of Political Science, Norwich University. 
l. See Debra L. Dodson, The Federal Courts and American Political Parties: Legal 
Constraints on the Development of a Responsible Party System I (paper presented to the Mid-
west Political Science Association, Chicago, April 11-15, 1984) ("American Political Par-
ties"). 
Dodson notes that "responsible" political parties can be held accountable by the voters 
for their actions. Id. "Because there is one party line, the voters know the policies that the 
party will try to implement if it wins office." Id. at 2. Similarly, "[b ]ecause the party is 
centralized and disciplined, the winning party has the resources to carry out its platform by 
coercion of unorthodox members if necessary." Id. 
In a responsible party system, "(p]arties would have to exclude both voters and candi-
dates with deviant ideologies in order to preserve ideological homogeneity." I d. at l. ''The 
party line would be determined at the highest level and lower level organizations and office 
holders would be compelled to follow it." Id. Hence, "[t]hose running under the party label 
would have to agree with the party principles and would have to support those principles if 
elected. If they did not, they would not be allowed to continue as leaders in the party." 
Id. at 2. 
At present, a responsible party system does not exist in the United States. Dodson ar-
gues that "[i]f a responsible party system is to develop, the party must be freed from control 
of those with pragmatic, non-ideological motives and must have the ability to control access 
to the organization. In other words, the party must be viewed legally as an extra-legal organi-
zation, freed from the pragmatic concerns of state legislatures and the constraints of the 
Constitution." Id. 
For additional analysis of responsible political parties and responsible political party 
systems, see generally, Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties in American Society (Basic 
Books, 1982); Austin Ranney, Curing the Mischiefs of Faction (U. Cal. Press, 1975); and 
Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 44 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. (supplement) 1-96 (Sept. 1950). 
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about the role that political parties should play in American politics 
and hence base their decisions concerning the regulation of parties 
upon constitutional doctrines such as equal protection and freedom 
of association, rather than upon a single, "holistic" model of party 
politics.2 
According to these political scientists, the doctrinal emphasis 
produced confused, contradictory and unpredictable results3 and 
hindered the development of responsible political parties in the 
United States.4 For example, "court decisions have improved the 
stature of the national party," which "has a constitutional protec-
tion that allows it to ignore state election law," but the "ballot ac-
cess cases and the patronage decisions surely have contributed to 
the general decline of political parties in recent years. "s 
In contrast to their political science counterparts, the authors 
who wrote law review commentaries on party regulation during the 
1980s optimistically assessed recent Supreme Court and lower fed-
eral court decisions, praising the implications for efforts to build 
strong, ideological parties.6 Although they did not share the polit-
ical scientists' pessimism concerning political parties, the law review 
commentators did share the political scientists' desire for program-
matic, disciplined parties. 1 The law review commentators empha-
sized what they perceived to be the Supreme Court's increased 
willingness, during the 1970s and 1980s, to view political parties as 
quasi-private entities whose members' freedom of association liber-
ates their organizations from legislatively and judicially-imposed 
regulation of nomination processes.s In short, the law review au-
thors focused upon the distance the Court had travelled in recogniz-
2. See note I. See also John Moeller, The Federal Courts' lnWJivement in the Reform 
of Political Ponies, 40 Western Pol. Q. 717 (1987); Malcolm E. Jewell, Political Ponies, 
Couns and the Nominating Process (paper presented to the Southern Political Science Associ-
ation, Nashville, November 7-9, 1985); Clifton McCleskey, Ponies at the Bar: Equal Protec-
tion, Freedom of Association and the Rights of Political Organizations, 46 J. of Pol. 346 (1984). 
3. McCleskey, 46 J. of Pol. at 361 (cited in note 2). 
4. See generally Dodson, American Political Ponies (cited in note 1). 
5. Moeller, 40 W. Pol. Q. at 731-32 (cited in note 2). 
6. See Note, Setting Voter Qualifications for State Primary Elections: Reassenion of 
the Right of State Political Ponies to Self-Determination, 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 799-830 (1987); 
Arthur M. Weisburd, Candidate-Making and the Constitution, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 213 (1984); 
Note, Primary Elections and the Collective Right of Freedom of Association, 94 Yale L.J. 117 
( 1984); Craig L. Carr and Gary L. Scott, The Constitutionality of State Primary Systems: An 
Associational Rights Analysis, 10 J. Contemp. L. 83 (1984); Craig L. Carr and Gary L. Scott, 
Political Ponies Before the Bar: The Controversy Over Associational Rights, 5 U. Puget Sound 
L. Rev. 267 (1982); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of Association: The Right to 
Hold a Convention as a Test Case, II Hofstra L. Rev. 191 (1982); James S. Fay, The Legal 
Regulation of Political Ponies, 9 J. Legis. 263 ( 1982). 
7. See note 6. 
8. See note 6. 
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ing the associational freedom of political parties, while the political 
scientists stressed the distance the Court must still travel if it is to 
assist in the development of a responsible party system in the 
United States. 
The discussion that follows is an attempt to reconcile these di-
vergent perspectives on the regulation of political parties and to as-
sess the status of such regulation in the aftermath of the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut 9 
and Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee.w 
The principal focus of that discussion will be decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court concerning state regulation of political party 
nomination and internal governance procedures. These decisions 
are sufficiently numerous and doctrinally complex that they war-
rant exclusive treatment herein; hence, Supreme Court policymak-
ing concerning patronage, ballot access by independent candidates 
and campaign finance must await assessment at a later date. Thus, 
this commentary will not endeavor to present a comprehensive re-
view of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence relative to state regula-
tion of political parties, but will instead undertake a thorough 
examination of the Court's doctrinal shift in the past few years in 
nomination and internal governance cases. 
There is merit in making this attempt to reconcile legal and 
political science perspectives because state regulation of political 
parties cannot be fully understood absent a firm grasp of both the 
doctrinal bases for the Supreme Court's decisions and the public 
policy goal of establishing responsible political parties in the United 
States. If the law review commentaries often lose sight of the public 
policy forest by becoming lost in the doctrinal trees, the political 
science commentaries frequently give short shrift to the trees that 
provide the forest with its peculiar hue and texture. 
Once the present state of party regulation is understood, it be-
comes possible to predict the direction that future federal court de-
cisions on this subject are likely to take. Moreover, an assessment 
of whether the federal judiciary is, as has been argued, an impedi-
ment to the development of responsible parties in the United States 
also becomes possible. 
The discussion that follows will conclude that the United 
States Supreme Court's decisions in Tashjian and Eu call into ques-
tion-at least with respect to party nomination and internal govern-
ance procedures-the political science wisdom that the federal 
judiciary represents an impediment to the formation of ideological, 
9. 479 u.s. 208 (1986). 
10. 489 u.s. 214 (1989). 
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programmatic, centralized and disciplined political parties in the 
United States.11 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SUPREME COURT 
JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING STATE 
REGULATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S CHANGING VIEWS 
OF STATE ACTION 
Until recently, the federal courts have upheld legislatively or 
judicially-imposed controls on political parties on the ground that 
the parties' direct involvement in the electoral process renders party 
activities "state action" within the meaning of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.12 As state 
action, party activities could be regulated or enjoined in order to 
ensure that they did not deny the equal protection of the laws to any 
segment of the electorate or abridge the right to vote or to associate 
with the political party of one's choice.l3 Party activities such as 
nominations were seen as "state action" because they performed the 
"public function" of selecting candidates to run for public office.I4 
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has held that 
although nominations can be state action, such as when a particular 
nominating procedure is required by statute, nominations are not 
necessan"ly state action, and thus are not always subject to constitu-
tional requirements.Is This is because the Court has substantially 
altered the state action doctrine by restricting the "public function" 
concept upon which state action has long been based to activities 
that traditionally have been performed exclusively by the state.I6 
In this doctrinal scheme, nominations are not state action be-
cause they have not traditionally been performed by the state.11 
Some states establish requirements that candidates must meet in or-
der to earn a position on an election ballot, such as a requisite 
number of petition signatures or a minimum percentage of the vote 
at an endorsing convention, but parties, not states, select the nomi-
11. See note 2. 
12. See, for example, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 
649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). See also Fay, 9 J. Legis. at 266 
(cited in note 6). 
13. See note 12. 
14. Weisburd, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 236-51 (1984) (cited in note 6). 
15. ld. at 232. 
16. Id. at 239-41. See also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Boker v. 
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
17. Weisburd, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 239 (cited in note 6). 
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nees. 1s Indeed, the nominating function bears no relationship to the 
neutral electoral duties customarily performed by the state, such as 
ensuring that voters and candidates are legally eligible to vote and 
to run, respectively, and that the casting and tallying of votes is free 
offraud.19 Although the nominating function is integral to an elec-
tion, it is not integral to the particular electoral role traditionally 
played by the state. Under recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, it 
is not state action.2o 
Accordingly, unless they are statutorily mandated, political 
party nominating procedures are entirely free from the restrictions 
that the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments impose upon states.21 
Nonetheless, this paper will demonstrate that doctrinal grounds 
other than state action exist for prohibiting the race, ethnicity and 
gender-based exclusion of voters from the nomination process that 
state action has prohibited in the past. 
B. THE AssOCIATIONAL FREEDOM OF PARTIES 
AND THEIR MEMBERS 
The Court first articulated the concept of freedom of associa-
tion in NAACP v. Alabama22 in 1958, holding that the state could 
not compel the NAACP to disclose its membership list. Basing its 
decision on the Due Process Clause, the Court ruled that forced 
disclosure infringed the members' "freedom to engage in association 
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas. "23 The Court indicated 
that associations were to be protected regardless of whether they 
focused on "political, economic, religious or cultural matters. "24 
Despite this broad definition of associational freedom, political 
parties did not benefit from NAACP v. Alabama until the mid-
1970s. In 1975, the Court ruled in Cousins v. Wigoda2s that the 
Democratic National Convention rather than the Illinois state elec-
tion laws should determine the eligibility of state delegates to the 
Party's quadrennial national nominating convention. 
Also during the 1970s, however, the Supreme Court in a series 
of cases upheld state regulation of state party nominations and gov-
ernance procedures. In Rosario v. Rockefeller,z6 the Court upheld a 
18. Id. at 246-49 n.221. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 251. 
22. 357 u.s. 449 (1958). 
23. Id. at 460. 
24. ld. 
25. 419 U.S. 477 (1975). 
26. 410 u.s. 752 (1973). 
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New York law requiring voters to enroll in their party of choice at 
least thirty days before the general election in November in order to 
be eligible to vote in the next primary election after the general elec-
tion. The Court reasoned that the enrollment statute was designed 
to serve, and would serve, the state's valid purpose of inhibiting the 
raiding of one party by voters loyal to another party.21 In Marchi-
oro v. Chaney,2s the Court upheld a Washington statute requiring 
the Democratic and Republican parties to have state committees 
consisting of two persons elected from each of the thirty-nine coun-
ties in the state. The Court accepted the state's argument that the 
statute served its compelling interest in ensuring fair and orderly 
nomination processes. 
In 1981, the Court hinted that Cousins would prevail over the 
primary cases. In Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rei LaFollette 29 
the Court upheld the right of the Wisconsin Democratic Party-
pursuant to state law-to elect its national delegates by means of an 
open primary, but simultaneously upheld the right of the National 
Democratic Party to refuse to seat delegates so chosen. The Na-
tional Party rules required closed primaries, and the Court rested its 
decision squarely upon the freedom enjoyed by the National Demo-
cratic Party and its members, under the first amendment, to associ-
ation for the purpose of advancing shared political beliefs. Justice 
Stewart's majority opinion noted that "[a] political party's choice 
among the various ways of determining the make-up of a state's 
delegation to the party's national convention is protected by the 
Constitution," and that "the courts may not interfere on the ground 
that they view a particular [method] as unwise or irrational."30 
Both before and after LaFollette, many political scientists nev-
ertheless concluded that states were free to regulate state party 
workings. They interpreted Cousins as resting primarily on the per-
vasive national interest inherent in a national party nominating con-
vention.Jt One commentator wrote that neither Cousins nor 
LaFollette established "any useful precedent for determining 
whether state political parties may challenge state laws that control 
27. Id. at 760-61. Later that term, however, the Court found the limits of a state's 
ability to require pre-registration. In Kusper Y. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973), the Court invali-
dated an Illinois law that prohibited a voter from voting in the primary election of one polit-
ical party after having voted in the primary of another party during the preceding twenty-
three months. The Court held that although preventing raiding was a legitimate state inter-
est, the statute infringed too far on the voter's right to associate with a political party of 
choice. 
28. 442 u.s. 191 (1979). 
29. 450 u.s. 107 (1981). 
30. Id. at 123-24. 
31. See note 2. 
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voter participation in state primaries for the nomination of public 
officials." 32 
On the contrary, LaFollette is a useful precedent for determin-
ing whether state parties may challenge state laws controlling voter 
participation in primaries because its conclusion that national par-
ties may challenge antagonistic state election laws is based not on 
the "national" nature of the national parties, but upon associational 
freedom, which is unrelated to an organization's national or state-
wide base. Indeed, LaFollette noted that political party members 
have a right to "protect themselves from 'intrusion by those with 
adverse political principles,' "33 which suggests that a party can de-
mand not merely nominal affiliation, but also acceptance of a partic-
ular ideology, as a condition of membership.34 Hence, LaFollette 
can reasonably be construed to view state political parties as organi-
zations whose activities, including nominations, are not state action, 
therefore are free from regulation by state legislatures and courts 
absent a showing of a compelling state interest in regulation and the 
availability of no less restrictive regulatory device than the one se-
lected.3s LaFollette can also reasonably be construed to view the 
freedom of association as guaranteeing the parties' right to exclude 
on ideological grounds. 36 
Thus, despite the political science critiques, it is reasonable to 
infer from LaFollette that state regulation of the nomination activi-
ties of a political party unconstitutionally burdens the associational 
freedom of party members unless the state demonstrates that the 
party's determination of who may participate in those activities, in-
cluding a primary election, bears no relationship to the commonal-
ity of ideological purpose underlying the right to associate.37 
Accordingly, the state retains power to prevent parties from exclud-
ing would-be participants as a result of their race, ethnicity or gen-
der because those characteristics bear no necessary nexus to 
ideology; the parties' power to exclude is a power to exclude on the 
basis of ideological incompatibility only.3s 
32. Jewell, Political Panies, Courts and the Nominating Process at 6-7 (cited in note 2). 
33. 450 U.S. at 122 (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1952)). 
34. Weisburd, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 213, 266 (cited in note 6). 
35. Id. at 270. 
36. See generally Note, 94 Yale L.J. at 117 (cited in note 6). 
37. ld. at 129. 
38. This power, though, does not derive from the fact that nominations are essential 
components of the electoral process, hence state action, as the Supreme Court held during the 
1940s and 1950s, in striking down statutes that restricted participation in primaries to whites. 
See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
Rather, the state's power to prevent such exclusions from nomination processes after LaFol-
lette derives from the fact that the exclusions are unrelated to the commonality of ideological 
purpose that underlies the parties' freedom of association. 
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This associational analysis of LaFollette has recently been vali-
dated by the Supreme Court. In Tashjian v. Republican Party of 
Connecticut 39 and Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central 
Committee,40 the Court held that state parties' freedom of associa-
tion entitles them to determine their own nomination and internal 
governance procedures free from state regulation. 
At issue in Tashjian was a rule, adopted by the Republican 
Party of Connecticut in 1984, that permitted independent voters to 
vote in Republican primaries for federal and statewide offices.4I 
The Party rule soon came into conflict with a Connecticut law that 
required voters in a primary to be registered members of the party 
in whose primary they participated.42 
The Republican Party of Connecticut, its federal officeholders, 
and State Chair challenged the primary eligibility law, arguing that 
it deprived the Party of its first amendment right to enter into polit-
ical association with individuals of its own choosing.43 More pre-
cisely, the Party contended that opening its primary to independent 
voters represented an attempt to broaden its base of support in the 
electorate, which was essential to its exercise of the freedom of 
association. 44 
Secretary of State Tashjian countered that the contested statute 
was the least restrictive means available of advancing Connecticut's 
compelling interests in: (1) ensuring the orderly administration of 
primaries, (2) preventing "raiding" of one party's primary by voters 
loyal to an opposing party, (3) avoiding voter confusion and (4) pro-
tecting the "integrity of the two-party system" and the "responsibil-
ity of party govemment."4s 
The Court rejected each one of Tashjian's arguments. In re-
sponse to her contention that it would be costly to administer 
primaries if the Party's rule controlled because additional voting 
machines, poll workers and ballots would be needed, the Court ob-
served that increased administrative costs were an insufficient rea-
39. 479 u.s. 208 (1986). 
40. 489 u.s. 214 (1989). 
41. 479 U.S. at 212. The rule stated: 
Any elector enrolled as a member of the Republican Party and any elector not 
enrolled as a member of a party shall be eligible to vote in primaries for nomination 
of candidates for the offices of United States Senator, United States Representative, 
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of the State, Attorney General, Comp-
troller, and Treasurer. 
42. Gen. Stat. Conn. § 9-431 ( 1985). The statue provides in pertinent part: "No person 
shall be permitted to vote at a primary of a party unless he is on the last-completed enroll-
ment list of such party in the municipality or voting district ... " 
43. 479 U.S. at 211. 
44. ld. at 214. 
45. ld. at 217. 
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son to infringe upon the associational freedom of the Party and its 
voters.46 In response to Tashjian's argument that the challenged 
statute prevented "raiding," whereby voters sympathetic to one 
party designate themselves voters of the other party so as to influ-
ence the results of the raided party's primary, the Court noted that 
the Connecticut statute at issue did not impede raids on the Repub-
lican primary by independents because it permitted them to partici-
pate in that primary if they registered to vote with the Republican 
Party beforehand.47 Hence, the law hardly served the State's legiti-
mate interest in curtailing raiding so as to insure the integrity of the 
electoral process. 48 
The Court also dismissed Tashjian's argument that a closed 
primary serves the compelling state interest of avoiding voter confu-
sion.49 Voter confusion is increased by open primaries, Tashjian 
contended, because voters find it difficult to identify the political 
beliefs of a candidate who is nominated in part by an unknown 
group from outside the party, but who uses the party's label in run-
ning for public office.so The majority opined that voters are not so 
easily misled as Tashjian claimed and noted that state election law 
would reduce the potential confusion occasioned by an open pri-
mary considerably because it required a candidate to receive at least 
twenty percent of the vote at a state party convention in order to 
earn a place on a primary ballot.si 
Finally, the Court rejected Tashjian's argument that the statute 
furthered the state's compelling interest in protecting the integrity 
of the two-party system and the responsibility of party government 
because closed primaries promote responsiveness by elected officials 
and strengthen political parties.s2 The majority acknowledged that 
Tashjian might be correct in her assertions, but noted that even if 
she were, the lesson of LaFollette-that "a State, or a court, may 
not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of the 
Party"---controlled.s3 This is because "[t]he Party's determination 
of the boundaries of its own association, and of the structure which 
best allows it to pursue its political goals, is protected by the 
Constitution. "s4 
46. ld. at 218. 
47. ld. at 219. 
48. Id. 
49. ld. at 220-22. 
50. Id. at 220. 
51. ld. at 221. 
52. ld. at 222. 
53. Id. at 224 (quoting Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rei LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 
123-24 (1981)). 
54. ld. at 224. 
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At issue in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central 
Committee were several sections of the California Elections Code, 
which forbade official governing bodies of political parties from en-
dorsing candidates in primaries, dictated the necessary organization 
and composition of the State Central Committee, fixed the maxi-
mum terms of office for the Chair of that Committee, required that 
that post be held, alternately, by residents of northern and southern 
California, specified the time and place of Central Committee meet-
ings, and limited the dues the parties could impose upon 
members.ss 
The plaintiffs were members of state and county central com-
mittees of political parties in California as well as other groups and 
individuals active in party politics in California.s6 They argued that 
the ban on endorsements and the restrictions on party self-govern-
ment contained in the Elections Code deprived the parties and their 
members of the freedoms of speech and association guaranteed by 
the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution. s1 
Secretary of State March Fong Eu countered that the chal-
lenged provisions were the least restrictive means available of 
achieving compelling state interests: (1) insuring stable government 
and (2) protecting voters from the exercise of undue electoral influ-
ence by party leaders and from the fraud, corruption and voter con-
fusion that could result from that exercise of influence. sa 
The Supreme Court rejected the State's arguments for both the 
ban on endorsements and the restrictions on party self-government. 
The endorsement ban violates the parties' freedom of association 
because it "directly hampers the ability of a party to spread its 
55. Cal. Elec. Code § 11702 (West 1977) contains the endorsements ban. Sections 
8660-61 and 8663 (West 1977 and supp. 1988) dictate the size and composition of the Demo-
cratic Party State Central Committee, while sections 9160-9164 specify the size and composi-
tion of the Republican counterpart. Sections 8663-67 and 8669 govern the selection and 
removal of Democratic Central Committee members and sections 9161-64, 9168 and 9170 
perform the same function vis a vis Republican Central Committee members. Section 8774 
limits the term of office of a Democratic Central Committee Chair to two years and prohibits 
successive terms, while Section 9274 applies identical restrictions to a Republican Central 
Committee Chair. Section 8774 contains the residential rotation requirement for the Demo-
cratic Chair and Section 9274 contains the same requirement for the Republican Chair. Sec-
tions 8710-11 specify the time and place of Democratic Central Committee meetings and 
Section 9275 specifies the same for Republican Central Committee meetings. Sections 8775 
and 8945 indicate permissible dues for Democrats and Section 9275 indicates the same for 
Republicans. Other Code sections specify all of the above requirements for the American 
Independent Party and the Peace and Freedom Party, respectively. See Eu v. San Francisco 
Democratic Committee, 489 U.S. 214, nn.2-IO (1989). 
56. Eu, 489 U.S. at 219. 
57. ld. 
58. ld. at 222-29. 
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message and hamstrings voters seeking to inform themselves about 
the candidates and the campaign issues."s9 "Freedom of associa-
tion," said the Court, quoting LaFollette, "means not only that an 
individual voter has the right to associate with the political party of 
her choice, but also that a political party has a right to 'identify the 
people who constitute the association' and to select a 'standard 
bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and 
preferences.' "60 
In the face of such violations of the parties' freedom of associa-
tion, the Court rejected the state's argument that the challenged 
statutory provisions were necessary for governmental stability and 
voter protection, because the state was unable to demonstrate that 
California's political system was any more stable in 1989 than it had 
been in 1963, when the ban was enacted.6t Moreover, the Court 
questioned why, if such a ban were needed to insure stability, Cali-
fornia was "virtually the only State that ha[d] determined that such 
a ban [was] necessary.''62 
The Court acknowledged that the prevention of electoral fraud 
and corruption is a compelling state interest that warrants state reg-
ulation of the electoral process, but stated that the state failed to 
present evidence demonstrating that a ban on party endorsements 
in primaries serves that interest. 63 
The Court rejected the contention that the challenged restric-
tions on party self-government served California's compelling inter-
ests in governmental stability and voter protection. 64 The Court 
noted that a state may enact laws that interfere with a political 
party's internal affairs in order to ensure that elections are fair and 
honest.6s For example, a state may impose eligibility requirements 
that voters must satisfy in order to vote in a general election, includ-
ing age, residency and citizenship requirements, and may specify 
waiting periods that must be observed before a voter who has 
switched party allegiances may vote in the primary of the "new" 
party.66 "In sum," said the Court, "a State cannot justify regulat-
ing a party's internal affairs without showing that such regulation is 
59. ld. at 223. 
60. Id. at 224 (quoting LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 122 and Ripon Society, Inc. v. National 
Republican Pany, 525 F.2d 567, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Tamm concurring)) (citations 
omitted)). 
61. ld. at 226. 
62. ld. 
63. ld. at 228-29. 
64. ld. at 229-33. 
65. ld. at 231. 
66. Id. 
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necessary to ensure an election that is orderly and fair. "67 
The Supreme Court's decision in Eu, then, stands for the prop-
osition that the freedom of association encompasses a party's deter-
mination of: ( 1) the structure that best allows it to pursue its 
political goals; (2) the identity of its leaders and; (3) the process 
whereby those leaders will be selected.6s A state cannot substitute 
its judgment for that of the party in such matters even if by doing so 
it would prevent the party from pursuing unwise, irrational or self-
destructive ends.69 
III. JURISPRUDENCE AND PARTYBUILDING IN THE 
NINETIES: THE IMPLICATIONS OF TASHJIAN 
ANDEU 
The major implication of the United States Supreme Court's 
decisions in Tashjian and Eu is the need for a revision at least with 
respect to nominations and party self-governance, of political sci-
ence critiques that contend that the federal judiciary is an impedi-
ment to the establishment of strong, programmatic political parties 
in the United States.7o This is because those decisions recognized 
the constitutionally protected freedom of political parties to design 
their organizational structures and mechanisms of candidate selec-
tion so as to promote their chosen ideological and/ or electoral ends, 
thereby giving the parties a powerful tool for achieving program-
matic ends should they wish to do so. 
In this respect, Tashjian and Eu represent a major change from 
Supreme Court decisions of the 1970s wherein the Court upheld 
state regulation of nominations and party governance procedures. 
The Court, in those earlier decisions, exhibited considerable defer-
ence to the rights of individual voters to participate in primaries and 
to the interest of a state in ensuring an orderly nomination process. 
In so doing, it gave short shrift to the associational freedom of polit-
ical party members to run their organizations and select candidates 
in the manner they believed to be most advantageous to their par-
ties' ideological and/or electoral goals. Tashjian and Eu, by con-
trast, recognize the importance of allowing political parties to run 
their own organizations and control their nominating procedures. 
That leaves us with the question to what extent this shift in juris-
prudence might strengthen responsible, programmatic parties. 
67. Id. at 233. 
68. ld. at 229. 
69. ld. at 232-33. 
70. For a list of publications and conference papers that contain such critiques, see 
notes I and 2. 
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A comparison of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tashjian 
and Eu with the goals of advocates of responsible parties reveals 
that that reasoning and those goals are indeed compatible. 7 ' One 
political scientist has written that in order for the major political 
parties in the United States to become responsible parties, they must 
be able to control: (1) who can participate in their primaries; (2) the 
types of candidates who can run under their respective banners; and 
(3) who can participate in their activities that are unrelated to 
elections. n 
The Court's decision in Tashjian supports the first goal. Ad-
mittedly, the Tashjian Court decided in favor of the Connecticut 
Republican Party's choice to open, rather than close-as responsi-
ble party advocates prefer-its primary election. 73 In so doing, 
though, the Court employed reasoning that should be dear to the 
hearts of responsible party proponents. The Court stated that a 
party's "determination of the boundaries of its own association, and 
of the structure which best allows it to pursue its political goals, is 
protected by the Constitution, " 74 and that "a State, or a court, may 
not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of the 
Party."7 s Such reasoning could just as easily be employed to up-
hold a political party's choice to close its primary. 
The Court's decision in Eu supports the second goal. The Eu 
Court held that a state cannot constitutionally prevent a political 
party from endorsing candidates in a primary election because such 
a ban "directly hampers the ability of a party to spread its message 
and hamstrings voters seeking to inform themselves about the can-
didates and the campaign issues. "76 
Admittedly, Eu did not hold that a political party can prevent 
an unacceptable candidate from gaining a position on its primary 
election ballot, but instead, merely held that a party is entitled to 
express its members' preference among the candidates on its pri-
mary ballot by endorsing one of them publicly. Nonetheless, 
although the power to endorse may not amount to "control"n of 
the candidates running under the party's banner, it does amount to 
influence. 1s 
71. For a discussion of the goals that advocates of responsible parties are pursuing, see 
note I. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
(1981)). 
76. 
77. 
78. 
Dodson, American Political Ponies at 3 (cited in note 1). 
Tashjian, 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986). 
ld. at 224. 
Id. (quoting Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex. rei LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 123-24 
489 U.S. at 223. 
Dodson, American Political Ponies at 3 (cited in note 1). 
See generally, Jewell, Political Ponies, Courts and the Nominating Process (cited in 
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One political scientist has studied thirteen states wherein either 
one party or both used either a formal or informal endorsement in 
gubernatorial primaries between 1950 and 1982. He concluded 
that: (1) endorsements discouraged challenges to the endorsee, es-
pecially when the endorsements were made formally, pursuant to 
statute; (2) even when another candidate challenged the endorsed 
candidate, the latter won 77% of the time and (3) endorsed candi-
dates enjoyed easier access to volunteers and financial contributions 
than did non-endorsed candidates, in addition to the benefits of 
favorable publicity and "momentum. "79 
Thus, although Eu does not guarantee political parties the 
"control" over candidates that responsible party advocates would 
prefer, it does guarantee them a degree of influence that should 
serve programmatic and electoral goals admirably. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Eu also supports the third 
goal stated above, namely, party control of participants in party ac-
tivities that are not directly related to elections. The Court held 
that by "requiring parties to establish official governing bodies at 
the county level, California prevents the political parties from gov-
erning themselves with the structure they think best. And by speci-
fying who shall be the members of the parties' official governing 
bodies, California interferes with the parties' choice of leaders. "so 
Moreover, the Court held that "a State cannot justify regulating a 
party's internal affairs without showing that such regulation is nec-
essary to ensure an election that is orderly and fair."s1 The latter 
statement can reasonably be construed as a grant of broad authority 
to political parties to determine who will participate in party activi-
ties that are not directly related to elections. 
The Tashjian and Eu decisions, then, clearly establish that the 
United States Supreme Court is not an impediment, but rather an 
important aid to the development of responsible political parties, at 
least as far as nominations and party self-government are con-
cerned. This is not to suggest that the realization of responsible 
parties is imminent in the United States, or that the Supreme Court 
is actively pursuing that end through the evolving doctrine of free-
dom of association. 
note 2). However, the power to endorse will not even amount to influence if the parties are 
unwilling to exercise their power of endorsement. Roy Christman and Barbara Norrander, A 
Reflection on Political Party Deregulation Via the Courts: The Case of California, 6 J. of L. 
and Pol. 723, 739-40 (1990) points out that even in the wake of the Eu decision, the Califor-
nia Republican Party decided not to endorse, except in special elections, and threatened to 
penalize county party committees that ignored state party wishes. 
79. Jewell, Political Panies. Couns and the Nominating Process at 17 (cited in note 2). 
80. Eu, 489 U.S. at 230 (footnote omitted). 
81. ld. at 233. 
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Indeed, Tashjian and Eu leave open the question of whether a 
state can require political parties to nominate candidates by means 
of a primary election. The Eu Court observed that a state may en-
act laws that interfere with a party's internal affairs in order to en-
sure fair and honest elections.82 In so doing, the Court noted that it 
had recognized, in American Party of Texas v. White,83 a state's 
right to require major parties to nominate by means of primaries. 84 
Moreover, in the great majority of states that require prima-
ries, state law does not enable party organizations to deny ballot 
access to candidates whom those organizations do not wish to sup-
port.8s In only eight states (Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, New 
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Utah) where 
nominations must be made by primaries does state law give parties, 
through endorsing conventions, a degree of control over candidates' 
access to the primary ballot.86 Typical of the eight states is New 
York, where the name of any candidate who receives twenty-five 
percent of the vote at the party's state convention will appear on the 
primary ballot, while other candidates must submit petitions con-
taining a requisite number of signatures in order to gain a position 
on the ballot.87 
Nonetheless, Tashjian and Eu do give advocates of responsible 
parties cause for optimism, because both cases stand for the propo-
sition that neither state legislatures nor courts should substitute 
their judgments for those of the parties with respect to the manner 
in which the parties themselves and their nomination procedures 
are structured, absent a showing of a real threat to the fairness of 
the electoral process.88 Tashjian and Eu have said that political 
parties, consistent with that proposition, can influence nomination 
procedures in their ideological and/ or electoral interests by opening 
primaries and endorsing candidates. 89 Therefore, parties should 
also be able to influence nominations by denying primary ballot ac-
82. ld. at 227. 
83. 415 u.s. 767 (1974). 
84. 489 U.S. at 227. 
85. Jewell, Political Parties, Courts and the Nominating Process (cited in note 2). 
86. ld. In four states (Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota and Wisconsin) at least one of 
the political parties makes an informal preprimary endorsement. Endorsed candidates in 
these states are more likely to be challenged in the primaries and they occasionally lose pri-
mary elections. Unlike their counterparts in the eight states that feature statutorily-estab-
lished endorsement procedures, endorsed candidates in the latter states do not benefit from 
special ballot privileges, such as easier access to the primary ballot or the top position on the 
ballot. Christman and Norrander, 6 J. of L. and Pol. at 738 (cited in note 78). 
87. Jewell, Political Parties, Courts and the Nominating Process at 19 (cited in note 2). 
88. Tashjian 479 U.S. at 224; Eu 489 U.S. at 232-33. 
89. 479 U.S. at 224-25; 489 U.S. at 222-29. 
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cess to candidates who receive little or no support at party conven-
tions or by replacing primaries with party nominating conventions. 
It is therefore reasonable to infer from Tashjian and Eu that 
when the Supreme Court faces the question of whether state law 
can require political parties to nominate by means of primaries, the 
Court will answer that question consistent with Tashjian and Eu, 
rather than with Amen"can Party of Texas v. White,90 which pre-
dates the ascendancy of associational freedom as applied to political 
parties.9I More generally, it is reasonable to expect that, as the 
1990s progress, the associational freedom model presented in Tash-
jian and Eu will enable political parties in the United States to gain 
control of the procedures by which candidates for public office are 
nominated. 
If parties do gain control of such procedures, they will become 
better able than they are now to "develop and advance programs 
and policies, recruit or train future political leaders [and] hold in-
cumbent officials accountable to a wide range of citizens and inter-
ests,"92 which are "the very functions that make them most useful 
and necessary in democratic government. "93 The parties' increased 
clout would make them more attractive to assorted interest groups, 
which would be likely to pursue alliances with the parties.94 Such 
alliances would enable the parties to "function as umbrella organi-
zation[s] for a wide variety of constituencies, to aggregate their phi-
losophies and policy alternatives and to encourage those groups to 
consider their values and goals in relation to those of others."9s 
The alliances might well "bring single issue groups into mainstream 
politics by offering them incentives to work within the parties."96 
In short, political parties would have an opportunity to do what 
they do best: facilitate debate, compromise and the effective presen-
tation of a common viewpoint.97 
90. 415 u.s. 767 (1974). 
91. See generally, Democratic Pany v. Wisconsin ex ref LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); 
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
92. Kay Lawson, Challenging Regulation of Political Parties: The Califomio Case, 2 J. 
of L. and Pol. 263, 276 (1985). 
93. ld. 
94. Fay, 9 J. Legis. at 263, 280 (cited in note 6). 
95. ld. 
96. Id. 
97. Gottlieb, II Hofstra L. Rev. at 191, 216 (cited in note 6). The Eu decision may 
already have provided this opportunity to political parties in California, despite the fact that 
longstanding anti-party sentiments survive there. This is true even though the state's prohibi-
tion against party endorsements in judicial, city, county, school board and special district 
elections (not at issue in Eu) has been upheld by a federal district court and the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. See Christman and Norrander, 6 J. of L. and Pol. at 733 (cited in note 78). 
There is a perception, even in notoriously anti-party California, that decisions like Eu make 
parties more powerful and "in politics, the perception of power bestows power." ld. at 741. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis calls into question political science criti-
ques written during the past ten years that argue that the federal 
judiciary is a barrier to the development of responsible political par-
ties in the United States. This analysis demonstrates that, in recent 
years, the United States Supreme Court has articulated a model of 
associational freedom that has greatly strengthened and promises to 
strengthen further political parties' capacity to govern themselves 
and to control the processes by which candidates are nominated for 
public office. In so doing, the Court has departed from its earlier 
doctrinal emphasis upon political party activities as "state action" 
subject to constitutional limitations and upon associational freedom 
as protecting individual voters' choices to align themselves with 
parties. Presently, the Court's doctrinal emphasis is upon the par-
ties' choices to exclude from their nomination procedures voters 
and candidates who are ideologically antagonistic to party aims. 
As a consequence of this doctrinal shift, it is no longer possible 
to state with certainty, as one political scientist did several years 
ago, that even if voters in the United States were to adopt favorable 
attitudes toward responsible political parties, the federal judiciary, 
including the Supreme Court, would remain an impediment to the 
achievement of a responsible party system in this country.9s There 
is, of course, a need to examine recent Supreme Court jurisprudence 
concerning patronage, campaign finance and the ballot access of in-
dependent candidates in general elections before it can be stated 
that the Court has adopted a clearly pro-party jurisprudential 
model in place of the subject-by-subject orientation it has demon-
strated in the past. 
Hence, it remains an open question whether the doctrinal shift 
described herein is part of a comprehensive reorientation by the 
Court of its views concerning the proper scope of constitutional lim-
itations on political parties. Nonetheless, that shift is real and it 
means that scholars can no longer state without reservation that the 
Supreme Court is an impediment to the establishment of ideologi-
cal, programmatic, centralized, and disciplined political parties in 
the United States. Indeed, if the present jurisprudential trend con-
tinues, scholars may one day conclude that the court has been a 
major contributor to the cause of partybuilding in this country. 
Perceived party power induces candidates to head party platforms preparatory to seeking 
party endorsements. Id. 
98. Dodson, American Political Panies at 54 (cited in note 1). 
